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AcTioN-JoIN= OF ACriONS-LAILiTy OF MASTER AND SERVANT-
LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. ABERNATHY (1916) 73 So. (ALA.) IO3.-In an
action against the railroad and its servant, an engineer, as defendants,
the plaintiff set out in one count that he was run over by a train of the
defendant and injured by the wilful and wanton act of the defendarit's
engineer acting within the scope of his employment. Held, that the count
stated an action in trespass against the engineer and in trespass on the
case against the railroad, and that, under the Alabama Code, these two
actions could not be joined in one count. Mayfield, Gardner, and Thomas,
JJ., dissenting.
A plaintiff could not recover in trespass against a master for the wilful
trespass of a servant, unless he could show actual participation by the
master, under the old rules as laid down in City Delivery Co. v. Henry
(1903) 139 Ala. 161. He could, however, recover in trespass on the case.
But he was not allowed to join trespass on the case against the master
with trespass against the servant. Southern R. R. Co. v. Hanby (Igio)
i66 Ala. 64!. The principal case follows the same doctrine. At common
law trespass and trespass on the case could not be joined because they
were separate and distinct actions and required separate judgments.
Courtney v. Collet (1697) i Raym. 272; Cooper v. Bissell (18ig) 16
Johns. (N. Y.) x46; Dale Mfg. Co. v. Grant (187o) 34 N. J. L. 138.
But when the same judgment was applicable to both forms of action,
as in Maryland, they were permitted to be joined. Gladfelter v. Walker
(1873) 38 Md. ilO; Williams v. Bramble (1852) 2 Md. 313. In many
states because of the statutes attempting to abolish the distinction between
trespass and trespass on the case, joinder is allowed. Bellant v. Brown
(1889) 78 Mich. 294; Barker v. Koozier (1875) 8o Ill. 2o5; Henshaw v.
Noble (1857) 7 Oh. St. 226. In Alabama, under the Code'of 1896, sec. 3293,
joinder of trespass and trespass on the case was permitted when both
related to the same subject matter, though the statute preserved the com-
mon law distinctions between the two actions. Louisville & N. R. R.
Co. v. Higginbotham (19o7) 153 Ala. 334. Sec. 5329 of the Code of 1907
was designed to give a broader scope to the above, and provides that all
actions ex delicto may be joined in the same suit. An action of trespass
on the case and an action of trespass against the same person can be
joined. Likewise an action of trespass on the case against the master
can be joined with an action of trespass on the case against the servant
even in the same count. Southern Ry. Co. v. Arnold (1979) 162 Ala.
570. It seems that trespass against the servant should be allowed to be
joined with trespass on the case against the master. The holding of the
majority judges in the principal case gives a narrow interpretation to the
Code and lays down a rule which, while it is theoretically correct, is




BILLS AND NOTES-ALTERATIoN-HoLDER IN DuE COURSE.-PUBLIc BANK
v. KNox-BuRcHARD MERCANTiLE Co. Er AL. (i916) I6o N. W. (MINN.)
667.-The defendant, Burchard, as accommodation party joined with G. C.
Knox in executing and endorsing individually their note to the order of
themselves, which Knox thereafter altered by stamping before their per-
sonal signatures the words, "Knox-Burchard Mercantile Co. by" and adding
the abbeviations "Pres." and "Sec." respectively after their names, and by
making changes on the reverse side whereby the instrument purported
to be the note of the company, endorsed by it and individually by each
of the officers. The plaintiff received the paper for value and without
notice. Held, that the plaintiff might recover against the defendant Bur-
chard, according to the original tenor of the note.
The decision in this case depends upon whether the title of the plain-
tiff is based on a forgery, or whether the bank is a holder in due course
of an instrument altered in a material particular. If the former, the
bank may not enforce payment against Burchard. Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, sec. 23. If the latter, however, it is entitled to recover
according to the original tenor. Negotiable Instruments Law, sec. I24.
The defendant contended that the section concerning alterations applies
only to changes in the body of the instrument. Prior to the act, how-
ever, entries altering the signature on a note and changing it from
an individual obligation so that it appeared to be that of a firm, were
regarded as material alterations. Haskell v. Champion (i86o) 3o Mo.
136; Chadwick v. Eastman (1864) 53 Me. 12; Montgomery v. Cross-
thwait (i8go) 8 So. (Ala.) 498. Even when some of the makers' signatures
placed on a joint and several note before delivery were forgeries, these
have not been permitted to affect the liability of those parties whose sig-
natures were genuine. First Nat. Bank of Durand v. Shaw (i9o9) 157
Mich. 192. Since the note in the principal case was to the order of the
makers and required their endorsement before it was complete for nego-
tiation, it would seem possible to regard all the altered signatures as
forgeries and still leave unaffected the liability of Burchard on his gen-
uine, unaltered endorsement. But taking the apparently more satisfactory
view, that the changes made were material alterations only, then the
fact that they were made by a co-maker will not relieve the defendant,
Burchard, from answering to a holder in due course. Builders' Lime and
Cement Co. v. Weiner (I915) i7o Ia. 444. The reason usually given for
the rule is that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he who
has made it possible for the injury to be committed shall be the loser.
It is submitted, however, that the reason is suggestive of some remote
degree of negligence, which seems entirely lacking in the principal case,
wherein the alteration was accomplished by a clever trick. One is likely
to feel, nevertheless, that the defendant, being held only to the obligation
he assumed and the damages which he might reasonably have counted
upon, should not be protected as against a holder in due course. More-
over, since the provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law, considered
in the light of previous cases, seem to warrant this interpretation, which
makes for the currency of credit paper, there would appear to be ample
ground for the decision of the court in the principal case.
M. S. B.
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CARRmRs-LIMiTATION OF CARRimE's LiA Xy FOR Loss OF BAGGAGE.-
NEw YoRK CENTRAL & HuDsoN R. R. Co. v. BEAHAM (igi6) 37 Sup. CT.
REP. 43.-An interstate passenger purchased a ticket on the face of which
was printed the condition limiting the liability for baggage to $ioo unless
an excess charge was paid for any valuation over that amount. The ticket
was presented at the baggage department and a trunk check containing
the same conditions was received. The trunk was lost and the passenger
sued to recover its reasonable value, disclaiming any knowledge of the
condition. Held, that the acceptance and use of the ticket established
prima facie an assent to the terms printed thereon, and that mere failure
by the passenger to read the ticket could not overcome the presumption of
assent.
As a matter of public policy it has generally been held that a carrier can-
not by agreement with the passenger free itself absolutely from its com-
mon-law liability for negligence. Brown v. Eastern R. Co. (1853) ii Cush.
(Mass.) 97; Saunders v. Southern R. Co. (r9o4) 128 Fed. 15; Buckland
v. Adams Exp. Co. (1867) 97 Mass. 124. But for a carrier to fix charges
in proportion to the value of the property is quite as reasonable as to make
the rate depend upon the character of the shipment In the Mlatter of
Released Rates (i9o8) 1[3 I. C. C. Rep. 550; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v.
Fraloff (i88o) ioo U. S. 24; Kansas City So. R. Co. v. Carl (1912) 227
U. S. 39r. A shipper's assent to the limitation on the carrier's liability is
presumed where the limitation appears in the terms of the ticket or check,
or in the published rates. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger (1912) 226 U. S.
491; B. & M. R. Co. v. Hooker (1913) 233 U. S. 97; Aiken v. Wabash R.
Co. (1899) 8o Mo. App. 8; cf. Cal. Civil Code (igoi) sec. 2176. The limi-
tation on the carrier's liability is valid because the lower valuation by the
passenger is made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two rates.
Hart v. Pa. R. Co. (i88i) 112 U. S. 337; Mo. K. & T. R. Co. v. Harri-
man (1912) 227 U. S. 657; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, supra. It seems
just that a shipper should not be allowed to reap the benefit if no loss
occurs, and to repudiate the transaction in the event of loss A limitation
based on an agreed value for the purpose of adjusting rates cannot be
said to conflict with public policy.
R. L. -S.
CARRImRS-PLACE OF DELIVE-Y-REATE.-NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R.
Co. v. GENmAL ELECImc Co. (1916) z44 N. E. (N. Y.) ii5.-Defendant's
plant covered i8o acres, and contained an elaborate system of privately
operated tracks connecting its various buildings. In a suit by plaintiff for
freight charges, defendant counterclaimed for allowance for transporting
goods over the tracks within its plant. Held, that such an allowance would
be a rebate under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Before the days of railroads, common carriers were expected to make
delivery at the consignee's home or place of business. Penner v. Buffalo &
State Line R. R. (1871) 44 N. Y. 5o5. But with an expansion of com-
merce and transportation facilities, delivery was expected to be made at
freight-houses, or on private side-tracks. Vast development of industrial
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plants, like that in the principal case, presents a new phase of the ques-
tion as to when delivery is completed, and it is difficult to determine
where the carrier's duty of delivery ends. It has been held that a common
carrier is not bound to deliver interstate freight on a private side-track.
McNeil v. So. R. R. (i9o6) 202 U. S. 543. A railroad is not bound to
deliver cars of livestock at a yard operated by a competing company,
though directly connected therewith by its own tracks, and the power to
make such an order does not exist under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Cent. Stockyards v. L. P. & N. R. R. Co. (I9o4) 192 U. S. 568. Tracks
privately constructed involving intricate connections between plant build-
ings are "plant facilities," and a railroad cannot lawfully compensate the
consignees for the use of these tracks with the latter's own motive power.
Such an allowance would amount to a rebate. Crane Iron Works v. C.
R. R. of N. Y. (igio) 17 I. C. C. Rep. 514; General Electric Case (i9o8)
14 I. C. C. Rep. 237; Karl Lumber Co. v. G. Ry. Co. (19I1) 2o I. C. C.
Rep. 450. It would seem that the system of tracks operated by the
defendants in the principal case, were within the term "plant facility"
and, therefore, the company was not only not entitled to compensation
from the railroad for hauling freight over them to their various buildings,
but such an allowance would have been a rebate under the Interstate Com-
merce Act.
L. J. N.
CoNSnTrur NAL LAw-AuroMoBmiE REGisTRATIoN-DEScRaIMINATION
AGAINST NoN-PESIDENT.-KANE v. STATE OF NEw JERsEY (x916) 37 SuP.
CT. REP. 3o.-The New Jersey automobile laws (igo8) provided for the
registration of all automobiles driven within the state. The registration
fee was $3.oo for machines of less than ten horsepower, $5.oo for thosd
of less than thirty, and $io.oo for those of thirty or more. Held, that
since the annual fees prescribed were not so large as to be unreasonable,
this requirement was valid and not an unconstitutional discrimination
against non-residents.
The highways of the state are primarily for public use, and the legis-
lature has regulative control over them. White Oak Coal Co. v. Man-
chester (i9) io9 Va. 749. In the exercise of this power, the legislature
may provide for the registration of vehicles and the payment of fees
therefor. People v. Schneider (1905) I39 Mich. 673; Buffalo v. Lewis
(igo8) 192 N. Y. 193. The registration is a police regulation, partly for
the purpose of identification. Allen v. Smith (1912) 84 Oh. St. 283; State
v. Mayo (igog) io6 Me. 62. A reasonable fee is a license fee, not a
tax. Commonwealth v. Boyd (i9o5) i88 Mass. 79. It follows that the
constitutional requirements of uniform taxation do not apply. In re Kess-
ler (i915) 26 Idaho, 764. The fees may be graded according to horse
power instead of being ad valorem. Matter of Schuler (1914) 167 Cal. 282;
Bozeman v. State (913) 7 Ala. App. 151. Where the fee is reasonable
in amount, it does not become a tax merely because a portion of the
fund so raised is used to maintain and police the highways. Jackson v.
Neff (1912) 64 Fla. 326; In re William Hoffert (1914) 34 S. D. 271;
but see Vernon v. Sec'y of State (914) x79 Mich 157. Where non-resi-
dents are compelled to observe the same regulations as residents, there is
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no discrimination against them which violates the federal constitution, for
discrimination involves the placing of a heavier burden on the one, or the
conferring of a special privilege on the other. Home Ins. Co. v. New
York (i8go) 134 U. S. 594; Giozza v. Tiernan (1893) 148 U. S. 657.
For other New Jersey cases in point, see Unwen v. State (19o6) 73
N. J. L. 529; Cleary v. Johnston (1909) 79 N. J. L. 49.
A. S. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--DuE PROCESS OF LAw-FooD--RmnuLAToN OF
THE PERCENTAGE OF BuTTER FAT IN ICE CREAM.-HuTcHINSON ICE CREAM
Co. v. IOWA (I916) 37 Sup. CT. REP. 28.-An Iowa statute prohibited the
sale as ice cream of a product containing less than a fixed percentage of
butter fat. Held, that the statute did -not take property without due
process of law, as the percentage required was, of itself, not unreasonable.
Statutes directed against adulteration of foods with deleterious sub-
stances have long been regarded as within the police power of the state.
On this ground a recent decision holds that the sale of food preserva-
tives containing boric acid may be prohibited by statute in order to pro-
tect the public health. Price v. Illinois (1914) 238 U. S. 446. As a further
step in the protection of the public, other statutes have been sustained
which aim at practices which deceive the buying public in regard either
to quantity, nature, or ingredients of the article offered for sale, even
where there is no doubt of its being wholesome. For example, North
Dakota has been upheld in prescribing certain weights in multiples of
which package lard must be sold. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota (1915)
24o U. S. 51o. Likewise, it was held that the city of Chicago could regu-
late the amount of bread in bakers' loaves. Schmidinger v. Chicago (1912)
226 U. S. 578. Also, by Missouri, New York, and Illinois statutes, dis-
tilled vinegar may not be colored in imitation of the cider product. State
v. Earl (1911) 152 Mo. App. 235; People v. Spencer (191i) 201 N. Y.
1o5; People v. Wmn. henning Co. (1913) 26o IIl. 554. Neither may oleo-
margarine be colored in imitation of butter. People v. Guiton (1912)
137 N. Y. S. 6oo. Many states provide a statutory minimum percentage
of butter fat in all milk offered for sale. State v. Schlenker (igoo) 112
Ia. 642; Commonwealth v. Wheeler (191o) 205 Mass. 384. In the prin-
cipal case it was contended that ice cream is a compound and need not,
if wholesomely made, contain milk or cream. On the ground of protecting
the public from misrepresentation, even in compound food products, the
Supreme Court of Michigan recently declared constitutional a statute
under which sausage containing more than two per cent of cereal was
treated as adulterated, although the adulteration was manifestly not dele-
terious. The principal case is representative of the modern tendency of
the Supreme Court to sanction an ever-extending police power protection
of the public against misrepresentation as well as against injury to health.
It affirms the great weight of state authority and seems clearly correct.
On a similar state of facts, however, see the contrary decision in Rigbers
v. City of Atlanta (19o) 7 Ga. App. 411. Possibly the limitations of a
city charter may be responsible for the view there taken.
M. S. B.
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CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAw-STATUTORY DEFINITION OF PuBLIc NUISANCE-
INjUNCTION AGAINST MAINTENANCE.PEOPLE x REz. THRASHER V. SMITH
ET AL. (Igi6) I 4 N. E. (ILL.) VI.Illnois Laws (915) p. 371 enacted
that all buildings and the fixtures and movable contents thereof used for
purposes of assignation or prostitution are public nuisances; that the
maintenance thereof may be enjoined; that the court may order that
the premises be kept closed by the sheriff for one year (unless security be
given to abate the nuisance); that the sheriff may remove all fixtures
and movable property, sell them, and after payment of costs pay over
the proceeds to the owner. Held, that the statute was valid, and pro-
ceedings under this act was not a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
The police power is universally conceded to include everything essen-
tial to the public safety, health and morals, and to justify the destruction
or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as
a public nuisance. Lawton v. Steel (1894) 152 U. S. 133. No vested
or constitutional right exists to use, or allow the use of property for
purposes injurious to either public health or morals. State v. New Eng-
land Furniture, etc., Co. et al. (1914) 126 Minn. 78. Every owner of
property holds title thereto subject to the authority of the state so to
regulate its use and enjoyment as to prevent and abate public nuisances,
and the enforcement of that authority works no legal wrong. City of
Waterloo v. Waterloo, etc., R. Co. (igio) 149 Ia. 129. The interference
by the state, however, must be confined to the prohibition of the wrongful
use. Where the nuisance consists not in the building itself, but in the
use to which it is put, the building cannot be destroyed. Welch v.
Stowell (1846) 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332. Statutes similar to the one in the
principal case have been enacted in other jurisdictions, and their constitu-
tionality uphold. State v. Fanning (0914) 96 Neb. 123; State v. Jerome
(1914) 8o Wash. 261; State v. Ryder (1914) 126 Minn. 95. It seems then
that the act in its remedial details as well as its general purpose, was a
proper exercise of the police power under the test that a police measure
must fairly tend to accomplish the purpose of its enactment, and must not
go beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion.
E. J. M.
COPYRIGHT-MUSICAL COMPOSITION-INFRINGEMENT-PERFORMANCE FOR
PROFIT.-HERBERT V. SHANLEY CO. (JAN. 22, 1917) 242 U. S. 591, 37 SUP.
CT. REP. 232.-The piaintiff was the owner of a copyrighted musical
composition which the defendant caused to be sung in his public dining-
room. No admission fee was charged. The plaintiff sought an injunction
on the ground that this act of the defendant infringed the exclusive right
of the plaintiff to perform the work publicly for profit under the Copy-
right Act of March 4, 19o9 (35 U. S. St. 1075). Held, that this was an
infringement of plaintiff's rights under the copyright.
The only case directly in point is that of Sarpy v. Holland (I9O9) 99
L. T. 317. This case on a similar set of facts decided that an entertain-
ment like that in the principal case was a performance for profit, and
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within the prohobition of the English Copyright Act of i9o8. However,
entertainments of a like nature have been held exempt from the opera-
tion of statutes which require all non-gratuitous performances to be
licensed, on the ground that they are not for profit. People v. Martin
(1912) 137 N. Y. S. 677 (cabaret show in restaurant) ; People v. Wacke
(I912) 77 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 196 (moving pictures in -hotel bar-room) ;
People v. Royal (1897) 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 258; contra, Weisblatt v.
Bingham (1908) 58 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 328. An entertainment given for
the patrons of a restaurant who are admitted on the understanding, either
express or implied, that they make some purchase, is not essentially differ-
ent from an entertainment for which an admission fee is charged.
Undoubtedly, the purpose in providing these elaborate entertainments is
to attract a larger and more wealthy patronage which is willing to pay
higher prices than are exacted elsewhere for the privilege of enjoying
meals in an atmosphere made more congenial by the diversions furnished
by paid entertainers. As a case of first impression it would seem that
the decision, although unsupported by authorities, is correct.
L. J. N.
EMINENT DOMAIN-TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE UsE-VETTER
ET AL. v. BROADHURST (x916) I6o N. W. (N~a.) Iog.-A and B were the
owners of adjacent tracts of land. A, under sec. 3444, Neb. Rev. St.
(1913) made application for the condemnation of a part of the land of
B as a site for a reservoir from which to irrigate the land of A. Held,
that the right of eminent domain could not be exercised for a purely
private purpose.
"Public use" as applied to the exercise of the power of eminent domain
is not capable of an exact definition. Some courts hold that "public
use" means "use by the public"; that is public employment, and conse-
quently that, to make a use public, a duty must devolve on the person
.holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish
the public with the use intended, and the public must be entitled, as of
right, to use or enjoy the property taken. Wisconsin River Improvement
Co. v. Pier (i9o8) 137 Wis. 325; Dice v. Sherman (i9o7) 107 Va. 424.
Another view is that "public use" means "public advantage," and that
anything which contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of
the whole community constitutes a public use. McMeekin v. Cent. Caro-
lina Power Co. (19o8) 80 S. C. 512; Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, etc., Co.
(i9O6) 35 Col. 593. Other courts hold that the true definition of "public
use" lies somewhere between these two. Brown v. Gerald (19O5) xoo
Me. 351; Albright v. Sussex Co. etc., Commission (1904) 71 N. J. L. 303.
There are exceptional cases, under the theory of "public advantage," where
the peculiar circumstances of climate and soil, as in Utah, permit condem-
nation for private purposes. Clark v. Nash (igo5) 198 U. S. 361. It is
certain that the government may not under any circumstances divest one
citizen of his estate for the benefit of another where the public interest
is in no way involved, even though compensation is made. Ozark Coal
Co. v. Penn, etc., R. Co. (1gxI) 97 Ark. 495. The fact that the public
will be incidentally benefited by the appropriation is not sufficient to
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supply the power, when the taking is purely for a private purpose. Jeter
v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co.,(1913) 114 Va. 769; Thorn v. Georgia Mfg.
Co. (19o7) 128 Ga. 187. The principal case, while sustaining the theory
of "public advantage" in general, does not consider the conditions irk
Nebraska sufficient to widen its scope of application.
E. J. M.
EViDENCE-PBESUMPTIONS-REs IPSA LOQUITuR-SuFICIENCY OF Evi-
DENCE.-FANSHAWE v. RAwLINs (1916) 98 ATL. (N. J.) 439.-In an action
to recover for the care and board of the defendant's horses, the defendant
set up a counterclaim for an injury to a mare which he proved occurred
while the mare was at pasture on the plaintiff's farm. He offered no
additional facts as evidence to show that the plaintiff was negligent, but
asked for an instruction that the burden of proof shifted, which was
refused. Held, that there was an error, as the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
fur, though applicable, warranted merely a submission of the question to
the jury.
Where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been clearly and distinctly
presented, most courts have held in the case of agisters, as well as in
negligence cases generally, that the burden of proving negligence affirma-
tively is on the plaintiff. Nichols v. Union Stockyards and Transit Co.
(1916) i93 Ill. App. 14; Everitt v. Foley (igo7') i32 Ill. App. 438; Whit-
aker v. Chicago, St. P. M. and 0. R. Co. (1g11) ixi Minn. 14o. A few
courts (principally in South Carolina) have held that where it is shown
that an injury happened while the animal or chattel was in the care of the
defendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies and the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant. Nutt v. Davison (1913) 54 Col. 586; Sulli-
van v. Charleston and W. C. R. Co. (1910) 85 S. C. 532. But the burden
of proof, in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, never shifts during
the course of a trial, but remains with the plaintiff to the end. Casey v.
Donovan (1896) 65 Mo. App. 521. In the sense of the necessity of going
forward with the evidence, to meet a prima facie case the burden of proof
may shift, but this does not mean that the defendant must show by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he used due care. Briglio v. Holt (i915)
147 Pac. (Wash.) 877. The principal case follows the majority rule, hold-
ing that the occurrence of an injury is merely prima facie evidence which
may warrant, but does not compel, an inference of negligence, and does
not necessarily amount to proof. Mumma v. Easton and A. R. Co. (19o5)
73 N. J. L. 653. Unless the facts are such that only one inference can
be drawn, the question is one for the jury. Vaughn v. Bixby (1914) 24
Cal. App. 64. The function of the maxim of res ipso loquitur, therefore,
is merely to carry the question of negligence past the court into the
field of the jury. Sewell v. Detroit United R. Co. (igog) I58 Mich. 4o7.
S. J. T.
EViDENCE-SUBsTANTivE LAw-OA AGREEmENT VARYING WRITTEN
CoNTRAcT-PARTIAL FAiLuRE OF CONSIDERATION.-INTERNATIONAL HAR-
vnsER Co. v. PARHAM (I916) 9o S. E. (N. C.) 5o3-A note recited on its
face that it was given for a manure spreader. The maker offered to prove
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a contemporaneous oral agreement that the payee was to deliver a knife
grinder also, and contended that a delivery of it was a condition prece-
dent to his liability on the note. Held, that the oral agreement would be
effective to show a partial failure of consideration, but not to show the
non-performance of a condition precedent. Allen and Walker, JJ., dis-
senting.
As between the immediate parties to a note or others having notice,
oral agreements affecting the fixed or implied terms of the note are
admissible. Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. IV, pp. 2443. So the consideration
may be shown by oral evidence, and the fact that part is recited does
not make the oral agreement ineffective. Everhart v. Puckett (i88i) 73
Ind. 4o9; Stringfellow v. Ivie (1882) 72 Ala. 209. However, an oral
agreement subjecting the note to a condition or contingency, or affecting
the time of payment, or the amount of payment, is invalid, since it affects
the variable or expressed terms of the obligation. Leonard v. Miner
(1898) 12o Cal. 4o3; Wood v. Surrells (1878) 89 Ill. ioT; Kelsey v.
Chamberlain (i881) 47 Mich. 241; Loudermtilk v. Loudermilk (i89Q3) 93
Ga. 443. Therefore, it seems the majority opinion of the court was
correct.
J.N. M.
INJUNCTION-SoLIcrING OF CusToMERs OF FORMER EMPLOYER-NEW
METHOD LAUNDRY Co. v. JOHN W. MACCANN (zi1) I6i PAC. (CAL.)
99o.-Defendant, after several years of employment by the plaintiff as
a driver and solicitor for laundry work, left his position without notice
and engaged himself in a like situation with a rival firm, soliciting laundry
work from among his former employer's customers and receiving some
of their business. Held, that an injunction would lie for soliciting, but
not for receiving work from the patrons of his former employer.
For a discussion of the principles involved in this case, see 25 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 499.
L. J. N.
PoLIcE POwFR-VALm ExFRcisE-BILL-BoAs.-THos. CUSACK Co. v.
CHICAGO (JAN. I5, 1917) 242 U. S. 526, 37 SUP. CT. REP. I9o.-An ordi-
nance of the city of Chicago prohibited the erection of bill-boards in
residence sections without first obtaining the consent in writing of the
owners of a majority of the frontage on both sides of the street in the
block Held, that the ordinance was constitutional and not an unrestrained
or arbitrary exercise of the police power.
It was contended that this ordinance violated the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. The first eight amendments, however, apply
exclusively to the exercise of power by the Federal government. Eilen-
becker v. Plymouth County (189o) 134 U. S. 31. It was also contended
that such an ordinance was a delegation of legislative authority to the
whims and caprices of neighboring property owners. The Supreme Court
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of Illinois had ruled that by the statutes of Illinois bill-board advertising
was subject to municipal control Cusack Co. v. Chicago (1915) 267 Ill.
344. This decision, so far as the U. S. Supreme Court was concerned,
settled that the ordinance attacked, was within the scope of the powers
of the city, and so valid unless clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. The
sole question before the court, therefore, was of the reasonableness of the
ordinance. It is settled that the "due process" clause does not have the
effect of overriding the power of the state to establish all regulations that
are reasonably necessary for the general welfare; that power can neither
be abdicated nor bargained away. Slaughter House Cases (1873) 16 Wall.
(U. S.) 36; Munn v. Illinois (877) 94 U. S. 113; Beer Co. v. Mass.
(1879) 97 U. S. 25. The court found in the principal case that the evi-
dence before the trial court showed the propriety of putting bill-boards, as
distinguished from buildings and fences, in a class by themselves, and
to justify a prohibition of their erection in residence districts in order to
protect the "safety, morality, health and decency of the community."
Since an absolute prohibition of the erection of bill-boards would have
been permissible, it is clear that there is nothing unreasonable in relaxing
the prohibition when the owners of a majority of the frontage in the
block consent that this shall be done. A similar thing is done frequently
in the case of saloons, Swift v. People (I896) 62 Ill. 534; and garages,
People v. Ericsson (914) 203 Ill. 368. The principal case seems to be
in accord with the weight of authority.
G. S., JR.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PAYMENT TO AGENT-CHECKS POTTER V. SAGER
ET AL. (i96) 161 N. Y. S. io88.-A was the agent of plaintiff to collect
a debt from the defendant. The defendant gave A a check made payable
to himself. A cashed the check and converted the proceeds. Held, that
there was no payment or discharge of the debt.
It is well settled that an agent to collect has no authority to accept
anything in payment except money. Baldwin v. Tucker (19Ol) 112 Ky.
282; Parker v. Leach (19o6) 107 N. W. (Neb.) 217. It follows that
the agent has no authority to take as payment, property, the note of the
debtor, or a time check. Reynolds v. Ferree (1877) 86 Ill. 570; Holt v.
Schneider (1899) 57 Neb. 523; Spence v. Rose (1886) 28 W. Va. 333;
Hadley Milling Co. v. Kelley (1915) 174 S. W. (Ark.) 227. A check if
not paid, though turned over to the principal and accepted by him, is not
a discharge of the debt. This, however, is on the theory that the check
itself is only a conditional payment. Max Freund v. Importers & Traders
Nat'l Bank (1879) 76 N. Y. 352; U. S. Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Geer
(1898) 55 Neb. 462. But if a check payable to the agent is given to
the agent for immediate presentation, and the check is in fact paid, it
amounts to a payment in cash and is a discharge of the debt. Thomas
Roberts Stevenson Co. v. Fox (1897) 43 N. Y. S. 253; Cohen v. O'Connor
(1873) 5 Daly (N. Y.) 28; see Hadley Milling Co. v. Kelley, supra. The
agent may be considered the agent of the debtor for cashing the check,
but he receives the money as agent of the creditor.
J. N. M.
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SERVICE OF PROCESS-JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER NoN-RESIDENT.-
KANE V. STATE OF NEw JERSEY (igx6) 37 SuP. CT. REP. 3o.-By the laws
of New Jersey (N. J. Laws, i9o8, pp. 613) a non-resident is required to
register his automobile, pay a license fee, and file with the secretary of
state a duly executed instrument constituting that official his attorney
upon whom all original process in any action or legal proceedings brought
against him and arising out of the operation of the automobile within
the state, may be served. Held, that in an action in personam, jurisdiction
could be obtained by such service of process on the secretary of state.
The long tradition.of English law has been that service on a defendant
must be formal and personal. Accordingly, in the absence of any express
power given by the principal authorizing his agent to accept service, juris-
diction over the principal cannot be effected by service on the agent, how-
ever great his authority may be with reference to the business of the
principal. Piggot, Foreign Judgments, Part I, p. 283; Conley v. Mathieson
Alkaline Works (19o2) 19o U. S. 406; Martin v. New Trinidad L. A. Co.
(1904) 13o Fed. 394. A personal judgment against a non-resident who
has not been served within the state, and who has not appeared or assented
expressly or impliedly to the mode of constructive or substituted service
adopted, is invalid even in the state where rendered. Laughlin v. La. &
N. 0. Ice Co. (1883) 35 La. Ann. 1I84; Freeman v. Alderson (1886)
11g U. S. 188; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714. Service of process
is within legislative control, subject, however, to constitutional limitations.
Thomas v. Mahone (1872) 9 Bush (Ky.) III; McCauley v. Fulton (1872)
44 Cal. 355. A state statute authorizing service of summons in an action
in personam upon the agent of a non-resident, where the agent has not
been appointed to accept service, would violate the requirement of due
process of law. Brooks v. Dunn (1892) 51 Fed. 138; Moredock v. Kirby
(iWon) i18 Fed. 184; National Bank v. Peabody (1883) 55 Vt. 492. How-
ever, jurisdiction of the person may be conferred by consent. Brown v.
Woody, Adm'r. (1876) 64 Mo. 547; cf. Wilson v. Seligman (1892) x44
U. S. 41; Pennoyer v. Neff, supra. A common example of this is found
where foreign corporations do business in a state which requires them to
appoint an agent for service of process before allowing them to transact
business within the state. The law may, and ordinarily does, designate
this agent or officer on whom process is to be so served. State v. St.
Mary's Franco-American P. Co. (Igos) 58 W. Va. io8; Woodward v.
Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co. (i9o4) 178 N. Y. 485. In the principal case
the state had the power to exclude motorists until they consented to
reasonable regulation and paid the license fee. Kane v. New Jersey
(1r) 8i N. J. L. 594; Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 U. S. 61o. It
seems that reasonable regulation permits a stipulation for service of
process on a designated agent, the secretary of state.
A. S. B.
WLs-DvmSE TO DECEASED CHII.D-RIGHTS OF DmvrsF 'S CHILDREN.-
KEHL V. TAYLOR ET AL. (1916) 114 N. E. (ILL.) I25.-The statute of
Descent of Illinois (Hurd's Rev. St i9i5-i6, c. 39) sec. ii, provided that
when a devisee, being a child or grandchild of testator, should predecease
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such testator, and no provision should have been. made for such contin-
gency, the issue of such devisee shall take the devise. The testator, after
making several dispositions, devised the remainder of his estate to his
"children." A grandchild, to whom a specific devise was made by name,
but whose mother was a daughter of the testator who had died before
the will was made, claimed to inherit her mother's share under a residuary
devise to the "children" of testator. Held, that she could recover under
the above statute.
Since a will speaks as of the time of the testator's death, the members
of the class are prima facie to be determined at the death of the testator.
Ruggles v. Randall (897) 70 Conn. 44. Richardson v. Willis (z895)
163 Mass. 130; Buzby v. Roberts (1895) 53 N. J. Eq. 566. The English
Statute to prevent lapses is construed to apply only to a devise or legacy
to a person named and not to a class, irrespective of whether the death
of the member of the class occurs before, or after the date of the will.
Olney v. Bates (i855) 3 Drew. 39; Re Harvey [1893] I Ch. 537. But
it has been generally held in the United States that statutory provisions
to prevent lapses, apply to a devise or legacy to a class. Strong v. Smith
(i89i) 84 Mich. 567; In re Bradley's Estate (1895) i66 Pa. St. 300;
Jones v. Hunt (i896) 96 Tenn. 369. However, this is not an unyielding
rule, and the will itself may indicate a contrary intention, and if so,
this intent will be adopted and enforced. In re Swenson's Estate (1893)
55 Minn. 3oo; Bailey v. Brown (1897) ig R. I. 669. The question resolves
itself into this: Does the statute apply where the devise is to a class,
one of the members of which is dead at the time the will is made, so
that the heirs of the deceased member may take? The decisions are
irreconcilable. Those holding the affirmative are: Bray v. Pullen (x892)
84 Me. 185; Moses v. Allen (x889) 81 Me. 268; Jarnison v. Hay (I87O) 46
Mo. 546; Wildberger v. Cheek's Executors (1897) 94 Va. 517. In other
jurisdictions statutes like that in the principal case are held not to apply
where the devisee is dead at the time of the execution of the will. White
v. Institute (1898) 171 Mass. 84; Lindsey v. Pleasants (x846) 39 N. C.
32o; Tolbert v. Burns (I888) 82 Ga. 213. It is believed that the weight
of authority is in favor of the proposition that a bequest to a class does
not include persons dead before the making of the will, who, had they
survived until that time, would have fallen within the description of that
class, unless there is something in the will, or surrounding circumstances
to show a different intent on the part of the testator. Inasmuch as the
plaintiff in the principal case was provided for elsewhere in the will, it
is questionable if the testator intended to have her take again under the
devise to the children.
L. J. N.
WILLS-PxSUMTrION-CONSTRUcrxOi.-Das BOEJF v. DEs BOEtuF (i916)
113 N. E. (Ill.) goo.-The third clause of a will read: "It is my will that
the balance of my estate, both real and personal, all descend to my wife,
Julia, and my son, Felix, as the statutes of the state of Illinois provide."
Held, that it must be presumed that the testator did not intend to die
intestate as to any property and that the word "descend" cannot be taken
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in its usual technical meaning; but the will must be construed as declaring
that, aside from small bequests to grandchildren, the property should be
divided according to the statutes of distribution, so that the wife would
take one-third and the son the remainder of the personalty, together with
the realty subject to the dower and homestead rights of the wife.
There is a presumption, unless it clearly appears to the contrary, that the
testator wished to dispose of all his property. King v. King (1898) 168
I1 273; In re Lloyds Estate (1899) 188 Pa. St. 451. The word "descend"
as distinguished from "purchase" is used in. its technical sense to describe
the devolution of realty to the heirs at law by operation of law. See
Tichenor v. Brewer's Executor (1897) 98 Ky. 349; Potts v. Kline (1896)
174 Pa. St. 513. In the principal case the testator apparently had two
things in mind: (i) that the widow and son should take all the residuary
estate; (2) that the widow should take her part which belonged to her
as a widow, and that the son should take his part as if he were the only
heir thereto, as both would have done if no will had been made. The
words "descend," "inherit" and "inheritance" are frequently given an
expanded meaning by legislatures and applied to personalty. Roundtree
v. Russell (1895) 11 Ind. App. 522. The term "descend" has been con-
strued as legatory, giving a granddaughter a vested remainder. Timber-
lake v. Parish's Executor (1838) 5 Dana (Ky.) 345. A widow has been
allowed to take as a "right heir" under a statute which created a surviv-
ing wife a statutory heir. Peabody v. Cook (19o9) 2oi Mass. 212. In
several English cases, however, the phrase "right heirs," has been con-
strued to mean heirs at common law. Young v. Gibbous [i9o2] I Ch. 336;
De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir (1870) 3 H. L. Gas. 524. If the intention is
manifest from the intrinsic and such extrinsic evidence as can be brought
in, the property will pass. Patch v. White (1886) 117 U. S. 210; Posley
v. Newton (i9o8) 199 Mass. 421. The written expression must express
the testator's intention approximately although not necessarily with exact-
ness. The court in the principal case seems to haye adopted a common
sense view.
G. S., J.
